Live migration of confidential guests

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- AMD SEV encrypts the memory of VMs, the hypervisor will not be able to simply copy ciphertext between machines to migrate a VM.
- Instead, AMD SEV key management API provides a set of functions which the hypervisor can use to package guest encrypted pages for migration, by maintaining the confidentiality provided by AMD SEV.
- Source VMs guest memory is decrypted with GCTX.VEK & then encrypted with GCTX.TEK with SEND_UPDATE_DATA command, and on the target VM, ciphertext data is decrypted with GCTX.TEK & then re-encrypted with GCTX.VEK of the target VM and written to guest memory with RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command.
Two proposals for Live Migration

- AMD Secure Processor (PSP) based migration, which uses AMD Secure Processor to export/import pages wrapped with a transport key. This is Slow Migration.

- In-guest migration or guest assisted migration. Fast Migration of confidential guests using an in-guest migration helper (MH) that is implemented as part of VM’s firmware in OVMF. The MH runs in a separate mirror VM.
State of patches:

Mailing lists the live migration discussions/patches are posted on (with links and references to the latest versions of all the relevant patch-sets)

Hypervisor/host Linux Kernel patch merged in kernel v5.14

Guest kernel and guest API patches v6 posted upstream on 8/24/21
  - https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1629726117.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com/

OVMF patches v7 posted upstream on 8/19/21
  - https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/79573?p=%2C%2C%2C20%2C0%2C0%2C0%3A%3Acreated%2C0%2Cashish%2C0%0%0%2C20%2C2%2C0%2C84997450

QEMU patches v4 posted upstream on 8/4/21
  - https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/cover.1628076205.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com/

Guest assisted migration (Fast Migration):
RFC patches for mirror VM posted upstream. Lot of related discussion going on KVM/QEMU mailing lists about alternative approaches, security issues, etc.
  - https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/cover.1629118207.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com/
  - https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210823141636.65975-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/
  - https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/79517?p=%2C%2C%2C20%2C0%2C0%2C0%3A%3Acreated%2C0%2Ctobin%2C20%2C2%2C0%2C84982978
Guest Page encryption status tracking

HOST

QEMU

{gpa_start, gpa_end}

guest shared regions list

KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL

User

Kernel

KVM

Kernel

Guest

Guest Kernel

KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
hypercall

Guest Firmware (OVMF)

KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
hypercall
RAM Migration: Sending & receiving encrypted pages

Source VM

QEMU

ram_save_target_page() {
    if (is_gfn_encrypted()) {
        ConfidentialGuestMemoryEncryptionOps *ops =
        ConfidentialGuestSupportClass->memory_encryption_ops;
        ops->save_outgoing_page(..)
    } else ...
}

Guest RAM

QEMU

ram_load_precopy()

ops->
load_incoming_page()

Target VM

KVM

SEND_UPDATE_DATA

encrypted data

 AMD PSP

KVM

RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA

decrypted data

 AMD PSP

user

sev_ioctl()

kernel

sev_ioctl()
Guest Kernel & guest API support

- Pre-alternatives hypercalls invoked to mark the "__bss_decrypted" section, per-cpu GHCB pages (SEV-ES) and per-cpu apf-reason, steal-time & kvm_apic_eoi as decrypted.

- apply-alternatives() called much later during setup_arch(), so we need of an early, pre-alternatives hypercall interface.

- All early hypercalls made via early_set_memory_decrypted() / encrypted() interfaces, which in turn invoke paravirt_ops (pv_ops).

- early_set_memory_XX()->
  pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed()

SEV/TDX specific hypercall
Continued....

- Guest support for detecting & enabling live migration feature vs. the following logic:
  - kvm_init_platform() checks if it is booted under EFI
  - If not EFI, 
    - i) if kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL) issue a wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL) to enable SEV live migration support.
  - If EFI,
    - i) If kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL) query “SevLiveMigrationEnabled” UEFI runtime variable.
    - ii) The variable indicates live migration support is enabled on Host & guest firmware, issue wrmsrl (MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL) to indicate all three components support & have enabled live migration feature.
QEMU Support for Live Migration

- To protect confidentiality of data while in transit need to add platform specific hooks to save or migrate guest RAM.
- Introduce new “ConfidentialGuestMemoryEncryptionOps” which will be used during encrypted guest migration.

typedef struct ConfidentialGuestMemoryEncryptionOps {

    /* Initialize the platform platform specific state before staring migration */
    int (*save_setup) (MigrationParameters *p);
    
    /* Write the encrypted page and metadata associated with it */
    int (*save_outgoing_page) (QEMUFile *..., uint8_t* ptr);
    
    /* Check if gfn is in shared/unencrypted region */
    bool (*is_gfn_in_shared_region) (unsigned long gfn);
    
    /* Save the shared regions list */
    int (*save_outgoing_shared_regions_list) (QEMUFile *...);
}
Continued....

/* Load the shared regions list */
int (*load_incoming_shared_regions_list) (QEMUFFile *...);

};

typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
   Object Class parent;
   +ConfidentialGuestMemoryEncryptionOps *memory_encryption_ops);
}
The patch-set detects if it is running under KVM hypervisor & then checks for SEV migration feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID. If detected, it sets up a new UEFI Runtime variable to indicate OVMF support for SEV live migration.

This is part of a 3-way negotiation of the live migration feature between hypervisor, guest firmware and guest kernel.